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Abstract
Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles
of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his sub-
sequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts
and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in
the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of
names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the
latter complex as well as simple common names. Names, proper or com-
mon, and simple or complex, occur as parts of quantier phrases, which
in conceptual realism stand for referential concepts, i.e., cognitive capaci-
ties that inform our speech and mental acts with a referential nature and
account for the intentionality, or directedness, of those acts. In Russells
theory, quantier phrases express denoting concepts (which do not include
proper names). In conceptual realism, names, as well as predicates, can be
nominalized and allowed to occur as "singular terms", i.e., as arguments
of predicates. Occurring as a singular term, a name denotes, if it denotes
at all, a class as many, where, as in Russells theory, a class as many of
one object is identical with that one object, and a class as many of more
than one object is a plurality, i.e., a plural object that we call a group.
Also, as in Russells theory, there is no empty class as many. When nom-
inalized, proper names function as singular termsjust the way they do
in so-called free logic. Le´sniewskis ontology, which is also called a logic of
names can be completely interpreted within this conceptualist framework,
and the well-known oddities of Le´sniewskis system are shown not to be
odd at all when his system is so interpreted. Finally, we show how the
pluralities, or groups, of the logic of classes as many can be used as the
semantic basis of plural reference and predication. We explain in this way
Russells fundamental doctrine upon which all rests," i.e., "the doctrine
that the subject of a proposition may be plural, and that such plural sub-
jects are what is meant by classes [as many] which have more than one
term" ([PoM], p. 517).
Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of
Mathematics [PoM] that he later gave up and never went back to in his sub-
sequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and
classes as many. Russell explicitly rejected denoting concepts in his 1905 pa-
per, "On Denoting". Although his reasons for doing so are still a matter of
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some debate, they depend in part on his assumption that all concepts, includ-
ing denoting concepts, are objects and can be denoted as such.1 Classes of any
kind were later eliminated as part of Russells "no-classes" doctrine, accord-
ing to which all mention of classes was to be contextually analyzed in terms
of reference to either propositions, as in Russells 1905 substitution theory, or
propositional functions as in Principia Mathematica [PM]. The problem with
classes, as Russell and Whitehead described it in [PM], is that
"if there is such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one
object. Yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence,
if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object
can be both one and many, which seems impossible" (p. 72).
Both notions are worthy of reconsideration, however, even if only in a some-
what di¤erent, alternative form in a conceptualist framework that Russell did
not himself adopt. In such a framework, which we will briey describe here,
Russells assumption that all concepts are objects will be rejected in favor of
a conceptualist counterpart to Freges notion of unsaturatedness, and we will
reconsider the idea of a class as many somehow being both one and many.
1 Denoting Concepts and Classes as Many
According to Russell, a "concept denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition [as
an objective truth or falsehood], the proposition is not about the concept, but
about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with the concept" ([PoM], p.
53). In particular, denoting concepts occur in propositions the way that quan-
tier phrases occur in the sentences that express those propositions. Denoting
concepts, in other words, are what the quantier phrases of natural language
express or stand for. Russell described only the quantier phrases based on
the six determiners all, every, any, a, some, and the, though there is no
reason why phrases based on other determiners, such as few, most, several,
etc., could not also be included.2 A quantier phrase results when a determiner
is applied to a common count noun, which, according to Russell, expressed a
class-concept. Russell also called a quantier phrase a denoting phrase. Thus, a
"denoting phrase ... consists always of a class-concept [word or phrase] preceded
by one of the above six words or some synonym of one of them" (ibid., p. 56).
Putting the determiner theaside and taking man as an example of a class-
concept, Russell claimed that there is "a denite something, di¤erent in each
of the ve cases, which must in a sense, be an object, but is characterized as a
set of terms combined in a certain way, which something is denoted by all men,
every man, any man, a man, or some man; and it is with this very paradoxical
object that propositions are concerned that the corresponding concept is used
1This occurs in his attempt to denote the meaning of a denoting phrase, which is the
denoting concept expressed by that phrase. See Russells [OD], p. 50.
2See [PoM], p. 55. We will not ourselves be concerned with these other types of determiners
in this paper.
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as denoting" (ibid., p. 62.).3 The object in the case of all men is the class as
many of men, which, according to Russell, is also denoted by men, the simple
plural of man, and which Russell takes as a synonym of all men(ibid., p. 67).
The other objects are more problematic, or "paradoxical", as Russell says.
The object denoted by any man, for example, is said to be a "variable
conjunction" of individuals, whereas the object denoted by a manis a "variable
disjunction" of individuals, as opposed to the object denoted by some man,
which Russell calls a "constant conjunction" of individuals. These are indeed
strange kinds of objects, and we will not attempt to make sense of them here.
But in giving these up Russell also gave up the notion of a class as many, which,
unlike the others can be formally developed in a way that provides a semantic
basis for plural reference and predication, just as Russell originally proposed.4
Russells reason for giving up the notion was that "even if there were such an
object as all men, it is plain that it is not this object to which we attribute
mortality when we say all men are mortal" ([1908], p. 70). This objection,
however, as we will later see, confuses mortality as represented by the verb
phrase is mortal in the singular with mortality as represented by the plural
verb phrase are mortal.
There is a notion of a combination, or conjunction, of terms that Russell
uses that we will attempt to reconstruct, however. In particular, according to
Russell, a nite class as many is "a numerical conjunction of terms" ([PoM], p.
67). "Thus Brown and Jones are a class, and Brown singly is a class. This kind of
combination," according to Russell, "is the extensional genesis of classes" (ibid.).
A class as many that is specied by such a combination, or enumeration, of terms
is what Russell also called a collection; that is, a collection is "what is conveyed
by A and Bor A and B and C, or any other enumeration of denite terms"
(ibid., p. 69). The word and, according to Russell, represents "a fundamental
way of combining terms, and that just this way of combination is essential if
anything is to result of which a number other than 1 can be asserted" (ibid.).
There is "a grammatical di¢ culty," Russell observes, that "must be pointed
out and allowed for," however, namely that "[a] collection, grammatically, is
singular, whereas A and B, A and B and C, etc. are essentially plural" (ibid.).
A collection, in other words i.e., a plurality, or what we will call a group can
in some contexts be spoken of in the singular even though what we are speaking
of is a plural object.
"The fundamental doctrine upon which all rests," according to the Russell
of [PoM], at least as far as the reduction of mathematics to logic is concerned,
"is the doctrine that the subject of a proposition may be plural, and that such
plural subjects are what is meant by classes [as many] which have more than
3One might well surmise that the problem of improper denite descriptions, i.e., the lack
of denotata for the denoting concepts expressed by such descriptions, was why Russell put
aside the determiner the in this context. Had he available the "free logic" approach later
developed, as we do here in our conceptualist alternative, he would have been able to handle
this situation as well.
4See Cocchiarella [LCM] for a formal development and proof of consistency of a logic of
classes as many, as well as an application of that logic to the semantics of plurals.
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one term" (ibid., p. 517).
2 Reference and Predication in Conceptual Re-
alism
In conceptual realism, our primary concern is with reference and predication in
speech and mental acts and not, as in [PoM], with denoting concepts as compo-
nents of propositions as abstract entities. To be sure, there are propositions as
the intensional contents of our speech and mental acts in conceptual realism, but
these are derivative from, and dependent on, the functional role of those acts in
thought and communication. In particular, as intensional objects, propositions
are evolutionary products of language and culture, derived through a process of
reective abstraction corresponding to the linguistic practice of nominalization.5
There are other di¤erences as well between Russells denoting concepts and
the referential concepts of conceptualism; but there are also some similarities.
One important similarity is that, as in Russells 1903 theory and the medieval
supposition theory of Ockham and others conceptual realism gives a unied
account of both singular and general reference and of plural reference as well,
which, apparently, the medieval theory did not do.6 Most theories of reference
in the 20th Century have been theories only of singular reference, as in the use
of proper names and denite descriptions. In Reference and Generality, [R&G],
Peter Geach argued against the whole idea of general reference and criticized
both Russells theory and the medieval theory in particular. In "Reference in
Conceptual Realism", [RCR], we showed that Geachs arguments fail in concep-
tual realism, and in "A Logical Reconstruction of Medieval Terminist Logic in
Conceptual Realism", [LRML], we showed that they fail against the medieval
theory as well if the latter is understood as reconstructed there. If Russells
theory were reinterpreted as a variant of conceptual realism rather than as a
form of logical realism, then they would fail there as well.
The main similarity between denoting concepts and referential concepts is
that both are what quantier phrases express or stand for, where, by a quantier
phrase we mean a quantier, such as 8 or 9 (or any operator representing a
determiner), indexed by a variable, and attached to a common name, i.e., the
kind of name that Russell took to express a class-concept. In conceptualism,
however, common names can be complex as well as simple and are part of a more
general category that includes proper names as well.7 Another similarity is that
there is a di¤erence in both theories between a plural (collective) reference to
all men, as in an assertion of
All men are mortal. (1)
5For a discussion of this reexive abstraction through nominalization, see Cocchiarella
[CRLF].
6Other than in Cocchiarella [LCM], plural reference was not an issue in previous papers
on conceptual realism but is a recent development of this framework.
7Though there is no reason to think that he would have excluded them, Russell does not
mention complex class-names in [PoM].
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and a general (distributive) reference to every man, as in an assertion of
Every man is mortal. (2)
This is because in both theories the quantier phrases All menand Every man
denote, or stand for, respectively, di¤erent denoting or referential concepts (and
in conceptualism the verb phrases stand for di¤erent predicable concepts as
well). Thus in Russells theory, the propositions expressed in these assertions
are di¤erent because they contain di¤erent denoting concepts though, appar-
ently, Russell also took these di¤erent propositions to be logically equivalent.
In conceptualism, however, although Every man is mortalimplies All men are
mortal, the converse, as we will later see, is not also true, which means that
their truth conditions are di¤erent, and hence that the propositions expressed
are not only di¤erent but not logically equivalent as well.
In Russells theory, again because of a di¤erence in denoting concepts, both
of these propositions are also di¤erent from that expressed by
Everything is such that if it is a man, then it is mortal. (3)
though, again, Russell seemed to think that this proposition is logically equiv-
alent to the others. In conceptualism, because of a di¤erence in referential and
predicable concepts, the cognitive structure of an assertion of (3) is di¤erent
from that of an assertion of (2), but the two do have the same truth conditions
and hence express the same proposition; both, however, di¤er in cognitive struc-
ture and truth conditions from an assertion of (1) if we assume, as we do here,
that all menis the dual of some menas used in a plural reference.
That we do not make a category distinction between proper names and
common names is a noteworthy di¤erence between our conceptualist theory of
referential concepts and Russells realist theory of denoting concepts. Proper
names are of course paradigms of expressions that are used to refer, but what this
means in conceptualism, as we note below, is that such a use is represented by a
quantier phrase. That is not how Russell understood the use of a proper name
of course. But then Russell also did not distinguish the use of a proper name
with, as opposed to without, existential presupposition. Such a distinction is
fundamental if our goal is to represent the cognitive structure, and in particular
the referential and predicable aspects, of our speech and mental acts, as it is in
conceptualism. Thus, for example, an assertion of Socrates is wise, where the
name Socrates is used with existential presupposition, is represented in our
conceptualist theory by
(9xSocrates)Wise(x);
whereas an assertion of the same sentence, but without existential presupposi-
tion, is symbolized as
(8xSocrates)Wise(x):
The fact that a proper name, unlike most common names, is used to refer to
at most one thing is stipulated by a meaning postulate and not by a category
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distinction between proper names and common names, or what Russell called
class-concepts.8
Referential and predicable concepts in the kind of conceptualism we have in
mind here are the intersubjectively realizable cognitive capacities that underlie
our rule-following use of noun and verb phrases in natural language. That is,
just as noun phrases and verb phrases are complementary, mutually saturat-
ing linguistic structures of our basic speech acts when noun phrases are used
as grammatical subjects, so too, in conceptual realism, referential and pred-
icable concepts are complementary, mutually saturating cognitive structures
that underlie those acts. As cognitive structures, neither kind of concept is
a mental image or object of any kind; rather, both are unsaturated cognitive
capacities that when jointly exercised inform a speech or mental act with a pred-
icable and referential nature, respectively.9 This is not the Fregean notion of
unsaturatedness which was a characteristic of functions of all types though
there is a similarity in that being unsaturated precludes being an object. More-
over, although predicable and referential concepts are not objects, their joint
exercise and mutual saturation in a speech or mental act does result in an ob-
ject, namely a speech or mental event, but not a truth value or proposition as
Frege or Russell would have it. It is noteworthy, moreover, that as cognitive
capacities, referential and predicable concepts can be exercised by di¤erent peo-
ple at the same time as well as by the same person at di¤erent times, which is
why, following a medieval tradition, we sometimes describe them as intelligible
universals, though universals of di¤erent and complementary types.
3 Cognitive Structure and Logical Form
One of the purposes of logical syntax in conceptual realism is to represent not
only the truth conditions of our speech and mental acts, and the logical conse-
quences of those truth conditions, but also the cognitive structures of those acts.
That is why predicable concepts, both simple and complex, are represented by
predicate constants and -abstracts, and referential concepts are represented
by quantier phrases, where the latter consist of a variable-binding operator
such as the universal or existential quantier, or operators representing other
determiners of natural language indexed by a variable and attached to a name,
either proper or common and simple or complex. Thus, on this account, the
logical form representing the cognitive structure of an assertion of Every man
is mortalis represented by
(8xMan)Mortal(x);
or, using a -abstract, by
(8xMan)[xMortal(x)](x):
8We restrict ourselves here to common names that are common count nouns. How mass
nouns are to be represented is an issue we do not deal with in this paper.
9All speech acts are mental acts, but not all mental acts are speech acts. The same cognitive
capacities that underlie our speech acts underlie our mental acts.
6
The quantier phrase (8xMan) stands for the referential concept being exercised
in that assertion, and the predicatesMortal(x) and [xMortal(x)] stand for the
predicable concept that is also being exercised in that assertion.10
An assertion of (2), Everyman is mortal, as already noted, has the same
truth conditions as an assertion of (3), Everything is such that if it is a man,
then it is mortal. The fact that the two general, distributive forms are equiva-
lent is a consequence of the following (export-import) axiom schema:
(8xA)'$ (8x)[(9yA)(x = y)! ']; (Exp-Imp1)
where A is a variable of the primitive category of names, both proper and
common, and simple or complex, and where (8x) is read as (or is taken as
abbreviating) (8xThing) or (8xObject). Speech acts that have the same truth
conditions of course do not necessarily have the same cognitive structure, and, at
least with respect to the referential concepts being exercised, these two assertions
in fact do not. Similarly, an assertion of Socrates is wise, where Socratesis
used with existential presupposition, has the same truth conditions, but di¤erent
cognitive structure, as an assertion of Something (is) identical with Socrates
(and) is wise. That the two have the same truth conditions is a consequence of
the related (export-import) schema,
(9xA)'$ (9x)[(9yA)(x = y) ^ ']: (Exp-Imp2)
Here, we read the quantier expression (9x)as short for (9xThing), or, equiv-
alently, (9xObject).11
A similar observation about this di¤erence between truth conditions and
cognitive structure, at least as based on the referential and predicable concepts
being exercised, applies to the use of complex common names. Thus, an asser-
tion of
Everyone who is civilized loves classical music. (4)
has the same truth conditions as an assertion of
Everyone (person) is such that if s/he is civilized, then s/he loves classical music.
(5)
10A predicate constant or variable and its corresponding -abstract are assumed to stand for
the same concept. Thus, where F is an n-place predicate constant or variable, the following
is a theorem of the general framework,
F = [x0:::xn 1F (x0; :::xn 1)]:
11As we will see later, once the logic of classes as many is introduced, these expressions are
also equivalent to:
(9x)[Socrates = x ^Wise(x)];
and
(8x)[Socrates = x!Wise(x)];
respectively, which are the more standard way of expressing the di¤erent uses of a proper
name in a logic free of existential presuppositions.
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even though the two have di¤erent cognitive structures. In the logical syntax of
conceptual realism, a dening relative clause, such as who is civilized, is rep-
resented by attaching a =to a common name followed by a formula, the result
of which is a complex common name. Thus, on this account, (4), Everyone
(person) who is civilized, is symbolized as
(8xPerson=Ci vilized(x))
where person who is civilized is a complex common name. The fact that
these two assertions (with di¤erent cognitive structures) have the same truth
conditions is a consequence in our conceptualist framework of the following
(export-import) axiom schema:
(8xA=') $ (8xA)('!  ); (Exp-Imp3)
which, as in these examples, stipulates that the one assertion is true if, and only
if, the other is. The related schema regarding the truth conditions for Someone
who is civilized loves classical musicis:
(9xA=') $ (9xA)(' ^  ): (Exp-Imp4)
Dening relative clauses that are iterated, as in Every professor who is male,
bald and middle-aged is having a mid-life crisisare covered by the same schemas.
This is because we associate the iterated occurrences of =to the left, so that
(8xA='==) 
is then seen to be equivalent to
(8xA=')(! [ !  ]);
which in turn is equivalent to
(8xA)('! (! [ !  ]));
and more simply to
(8xA)(' ^  ^  !  ):
Also, note that (8x=F (x))G(x), which is read as Everything that is F is G, is
then equivalent to (8x)[F (x)! G(x)], which is read as Everything is such that
if it is F , then it is G.12
Though it might be a point of some contention, we also take an assertion of
Every civilized person loves classical musicto have the same cognitive struc-
ture, and not just the same truth conditions, as an assertion of Everyone (per-
son) who is civilized loves classical music. In other words, most, though not all,
prenominal modiers (attributive adjectives) really amount to dening relative
clauses on a common name. Thus a civilized person is a person who is civilized
12See Cocchiarella, [LCM], §2, for a detailed description for what is there called the simple
logic of names.
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and a red car is a car that is red, etc. Some problematic cases, such as alleged
thief, or big mouse, can be expressed in terms of a relative clause, as person
who is alleged to be a thiefand mouse that is big for a mouse(or mouse that
is bigger than most mice, which is sometime challenged as inadequate). The
prenominals fake, as in fake diamond, deadas in dead man, and pseudo-
as in pseudo-intellectual are probably not analyzable this way but must in-
stead be taken as common names themselves.13 Meaning postulates would then
stipulate that a fake diamond is not a diamond, that a dead man is not a man
(anymore), and that a pseudo-intellectual is not an intellectual.
Finally, although Russell did not say what denoting concept was expressed by
the denite article, it is noteworthy that in conceptualism this kind of singular
reference has essentially the same truth conditions that Russell later gave to
denite descriptions, at least when the use of the denite description is with,
as opposed to without, existential presupposition. Thus, in conceptualism an
assertion of the form
The A that is F is G;
where the referential concept expressed by The A that is Fis used with exis-
tential presupposition, is symbolized as
(91xA=F (x))G(x):
Here, the denite description is represented by (91xA=F (x)), where 91 is a
variable-binding operator (quantier) representing the determiner the. The
fact that this assertion has the same truth conditions as the sentence, There is
exactly one A that is F and it is G, is stipulated in the following axiom schema:
(91xA=F (x))G(x)$ (9xA=F (x))[(8yA=F (y))(y = x) ^G(x)]:
When The A that is Fis used without existential presupposition, we have the
following schema:
(81xA=F (x))G(x)$ (8xA=F (x))[(8yA=F (y))(y = x)! G(x)];
which tells us that the assertion has the same truth conditions as If there is
exactly one A that is F , then it is G.
4 Le´sniewskis Logic of Names
Stanislaw Le´sniewski, who with ×ukasiewicz was a founder of the Warsaw school
of logic, was greatly inuenced by Russells paradox and Russells subsequent
development of the ramied theory of types. His own later system of logic
consisted of several parts, one being a version of the simple theory of types, but
which he called a theory of semantic categories; another, which was really a part
13 It is not clear, e.g., that fake is to be construed as a modier of common names;
otherwise, by iteration we would have such oddities as fake fake diamondand fake fake fake
diamond. An alternative is to take fake diamondas a basic common name itself.
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of his theory of types, was a quantied propositional logic with quantiers over
truth functions, which he called protothetic. A third was mereology, a theory of
the relation between parts and wholes; and a fourth was his system of ontology,
which was a logic of names that he placed at the base of his theory of types.14
The logic of names, it turns out, is strikingly similar to the conceptualist logic of
names briey described above except, that is, for how the category of names
gures in the logical forms of each theory. Nevertheless, despite this di¤erence,
Le´sniewskis logic of names can be translated into, and in that sense completely
interpreted within, our conceptualist logic of names, so that the translation
of every theorem of Le´sniewskis logic becomes a theorem of our conceptualist
logic.15 Also, because our conceptualist logic of names is part of the fuller
system of conceptual realism, which is equivalent to the simple theory of types,
this means that Le´sniewskis entire system, except perhaps for mereology, is
completely interpretable within the framework of conceptual realism.
In Le´sniewskis logic of names, as in our conceptualist logic, there is distinc-
tion between (1) shared or common names, such as man, horse, house, etc.,
and even the ultimate superordinate common name thing; (2) unshared names,
i.e., names that name just one thing, such as proper names; and (3) vacuous
names, i.e., names that name nothing.16 The categorial di¤erence, however, is
that in Le´sniewskis system names are of the same category as the variables of
lowest type or order, which are usually called individual, or object, variables,
and which means that they are legitimate substituends for those variables. In
our conceptualist logic, as already noted, names form a separate category to
which quantiers are applied and that result in quantier phrases when so ap-
plied.
Because of the way that names are represented in his logic, Le´sniewskis
system has seemed odd or quirky to many logicians and philosophers of logic.
The one primitive of this logic, aside from logical constants, is the relation
symbol "for singular inclusion, which is read as the copula is (a), as in John
is a teacher, where both Johnand teacherare names.17 With a, b, c, etc.,
as individual constants or variables for names, the basic formula of the logic is
a " b, and though either shared, unshared, or vacuous names may occur in
place of aand bin this formula, a statement of this form is taken to be true
only if anames exactly one thing and that thing is also named by b, though
bmight name other things as well, as in our example of John is a teacher.
Identity is not a logical primitive of the system, as it in our conceptualist logic,
but is dened instead as follows:
a = b =df a " b ^ b " a:
That is, a = b is true in Le´sniewskis logic if, and only if, a and b are
14See Slupeckis [LC] for a description of the di¤erent parts of Le´sniewskis system.
15See Cocchiarellas [CILO] for a detailed proof of this claim.
16See Lewjeskis [LO] for a detailed description of Le´sniewskis logic of names.
17Apparently, it was ×ukasiewicz who prompted Le´sniewski to develop his logic of names
when he expressed dissatisfaction with the way G. Peano used 2for the copula in set theory.
Cp. p. 414 of Rickeys [SLL].
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unshared names that name the same thing. That seems like a plausible thesis,
except that then, where ais a shared or vacuous name, a = ais false. In fact,
because there are necessarily vacuous names, such as thing that is both square
and and not square, the following is provable in Le´sniewskis logic:
(9a)(a 6= a);
which does not seem like a plausible thesis. Another valid thesis is:
'(c=a)! (9a)'(a);
which seems counter-intuitive when cis a vacuous name. Of course, maybe the
quantiers are not to be interpreted referentially but substitutionally as Quine
once suggested ([RR], p. 99). That, however, is not how Le´sniewski seemed to
understand his logic of names, which he also called ontology.18
It should also be noted that despite the similarity of Le´sniewskis episilon
symbol, ", with the epsilon symbol, 2, of set theory, the two should not be
confused. In particular, whereas the following:
a " b! a " a;
a " b ^ b " c! a " c;
are both theorems of Le´sniewskis system, both are invalid for membership in a
set.
Now all of the oddities of Le´sniewskis system are explained in our concep-
tualist logic once we locate the category of names as parts of quantiers. Thus,
correlating Le´sniewskis name variables a, b, c, etc., with our conceptualist
nominal variables A, B, C, etc., we can translate Le´sniewskis basic formula
a " bas:
(8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x = y);
which translates a " bas saying that there is at most one a and that some a
is (a) b, which is equivalent to saying that exactly one thing is (an) a and that
thing is (a) b, which, as already noted, is how Le´sniewski understood a " bas
singular inclusion. Note that the translation of Le´sniewskis
'(c=a)! (9a)'(a);
is:
'(C=A)! (9A)'(A);
which is provable in our conceptualist logic (where C is free for A in '). Also
it easy to see that the translation of
a " b! a " a;
namely,
(8xA)(8yA)(x = y)^(9xA)(9yB)(x = y)! (8xA)(8yA)(x = y)^(9xA)(9yA)(x = y);
18See, e.g., Lejewski [LO} and Küng and Canty [SQLQ] for a discussion of this issue.
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which says that if exactly one thing is an A and that thing is a B, then exactly
one thing is an A and that thing is an A. Similarly, the translation of
a " b ^ b " c! a " c;
which we will avoid writing out in full here, says that if exactly one thing is an
A and that thing is a B and that if exactly one thing is a B which therefore
is the one thing that is an A then exactly one thing is A and that thing is C,
which is easily seen to be provable in our conceptualist logic.
In regard to the seemingly implausible thesis
(9a)(a 6= a);
let us note rst that, by Le´sniewskis denition of identity (and hence of non-
identity), (a 6= a) is really short for :(a " a ^ a " a), which is equivalent to
:(a " a). On our conceptualist interpretation, this formula translates into
:[(8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yA)(x = y)];
which in e¤ect says that it is not the case that exactly one thing is an A, a
thesis that is provable in our conceptualist logic when A is taken as a necessarily
vacuous name, such as object that is not self-identical, which is symbolized as
=(x 6= x)(or more fully as Object=(x 6= x)). In other words, the translation
of Le´sniewskis thesis,
(9a)(a 6= a);
is equivalent in our conceptualist logic to
(9A):[(8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yA)(x = y)];
which is provable in this logic.
Note also that because (a = b) in Le´sniewskis logic means (a " b ^ b " a),
then the translation of (a = b) into our conceptualist logic becomes
(8xA)(8yA)(x = y)^(9xA)(9yB)(x = y)^(8xB)(8yB)(x = y)^(9xB)(9yA)(x = y);
which in e¤ect says that exactly one thing is A and that thing is B, and that
exactly one thing is B and that thing is A, a statement that is true when A and
B are proper names, or unshared common names, of the same thing, and false
otherwise, which is exactly how Le´sniewski understood the situation.
Finally, putting aside Le´sniewskis denition of identity, it is noteworthy
that even though A = B, unlike x = y, is not a well-formed formula of our
conceptualist logic with identity as a primitive logical constant, nevertheless, it
will be well-formed once we extend the framework to include a logic of classes as
many in terms of the nominalizationof names, i.e., once names are allowed to
be transformed from expressions that occur only as parts of quantier phrases
to terms that can be substituted for object variables. And in that extended
framework, as we will see, when A and B are proper names, or unshared common
names, of the same thing, then A = B will be true even independently of
Le´sniewskis denition of identity.
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5 Nominalization and Logical Form in Concep-
tual Realism
The original core part of the logical framework of conceptual realism is a second-
order predicate logic that allows predicates to be nominalized and occur as ab-
stract singular terms. The latter are understood not as denoting the predicable
concepts that predicates stand for in their (pragmatic) role as predicates but
the intensional contents of those concepts.19 This framework, as already noted,
is equivalent to the theory of simple types, but, except for the grammatical
distinction between predicates and their argument (or subject) positions, it is
otherwise type-free in the traditional sense; i.e., there is no category distinction
between di¤erent types of (n-place) predicates (for each natural number n).20
Of course, the distinction between names, proper or common and complex or
simple, and predicates is a distinction between categories of expressions, but it
is not a distinction between types of predicates, or types of singular terms, as
in the traditional sense of type theory. Rather, it is a distinction based upon
the di¤erent parts of speech in natural language.
This core framework contains not just a logic of nominalized predicates but
of nominalized quantier phrases as well. This second kind of nominalization
is achieved rst through a correlation of referential concepts i.e., the concepts
that quantier phrases stand for with certain corresponding predicable con-
cepts, and then of the latter, through nominalization, with their intensional
contents. In this way, we have a representation not only of the intensional con-
tents of predicable concepts but of the intensional contents of referential con-
cepts as well. In terms of cognitive structure, a nominalized quantier phrase
occurring, e.g., as the direct object of a transitive verb is not being actively
used to refer but rather represents a deactivation of the referential concept the
quantier phrase stands for when it is used (as a grammatical subject) to refer
to one or more things. For example, in John seeks a unicorn, the quantier
phrase a unicornthat is the direct object of seeksis not being used to refer
to a unicorn; rather, the referential concept it stands for has been deactivated
so that only its intensional content is involved in the truth conditions of the
verb phrase seek a unicorn.21 This deactivation is logically represented by a
nominalization of the quantier phrase as follows (where we assume John is
being used with existential presupposition):
(9xJohn)[xSeek(x; [9yUnicorn])](x):
19 In conceptualism, denotation is a semantic notion and is not the same as reference, which
is a pragmatic notion. It is in the truth conditions of sentences, and especially of predicate
expressions containing nominalized predicates as arguments, that the denotata of the latter
play a role.
20Of course there is a distinction between n-place and m-place predicates for m 6= n.
21This example is from Montagues [PTQ]. Montagues intensional logic does not involve
the distinction between activated and deactivated referential concepts, however, but is a type-
theoretical, logical realist framework in which intensional entities are higher-order objects
instead.
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Here, as noted, the bracketed expression [9yUnicorn] is really a nominalized
(complex) predicate; i.e., by denition,
[9yUnicorn] = [F (9yUnicorn)F (y)];
where [F (9yUnicorn)F (y)] is short for [z(9F )(z = F ^ (9yUnicorn)F (y))].
The same nominalized (complex) predicate occurs in John nds a unicorn,
(9xJohn)[xFind(x; [9yUnicorn])](x):
The di¤erence between John seeks a unicornand John nds a unicornis not
in their logical form, where the referential concept represented by a unicorn
has been deactivated in both, but in the fact that Seek, unlike Find, does
not have a meaning postulate stipulating that it is extensional in its second-
argument position.22 This di¤erence between the activation of a referential
concept and its deactivation, as in ction as well as in intentional contexts, is
another di¤erence between the referential concepts of conceptual realism and the
denoting concepts of Russells theory.23 In Russells theory, quantier phrases
express the same denoting concept and denote the same object whether used as
grammatical subjects or as direct or indirect objects of discourse.
Now we will not be concerned with nominalizations of predicates and quanti-
er phrases in this paper but with a di¤erent type of nominalization altogether.24
Names, as we have said, whether proper or common and complex or simple, are
used to refer when they occur in sentences as parts of quantier phrases function-
ing as grammatical subjects. But names, both proper and common, as Geach
has noted, can also be used outside of the context of a sentence,namely, when
they are used "in simple acts of naming," which are not assertions and do not
involve the use of a name to refer ([R&G], p. 52). Nouns in the vocative case
used in greetings, and again ejaculations like Wolf! and Fire! illustrate this
independent use of names," according to Geach (ibid.). We also get a very
similar use of names when labels are stuck on things, e.g., poisonon a bottle
or the name labels sometimes worn at conferences" (ibid.). This use, especially
in the case of proper names and sortal common names, i.e., names that have
identity criteria associated with their use, is conceptually prior to the referential
use of names in sentences.
There are nonreferential uses of names in sentences as well, as when we speak
of mankind, or humankind, by which we mean the totality, or entire group, of
humans.25 Thus, we say that Socrates is a member of mankind, as well as
22That is, whereas for Findwe have the meaning postulate:
[xFind(x; [QyA])] = [x(QyA)Find(x; y)];
where Q is a quantier, no such meaning postulate holds for Seek except perhaps for the
phrase a certain, as in seek a certain unicorn.
23The di¤erence between an activated and a deactivated referential concept is the basis of
our refutation in [RCR] of Geachs criticism of general reference in [ R&G].
24For a fuller description of the nominalization of quantifeir phrases and a defense of general
reference, see Cocchiarella [RCR].
25See, e.g., Sellars [G&E], p. 253.
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that Socrates is a man. Also, instead of mankind, we can use the plural of
manand say that Socrates is one among men. These are transformations of
the name maninto a "singular term", i.e., an expression that can occur as an
argument of predicates, and amount in e¤ect to another type of nominalization.
These kinds of nominalizations of manand human(as in humankind) are
di¤erent, however, from the nominalization, or transformation, of the predicate
adjective humaninto an abstract singular term, humanity, or the gerundive
phrase being human; and they are similarly di¤erent from the transformation
of man into the innitive and gerundive phrases to be a man and being
a man, which are represented in logical syntax by a nominalization of the
(complex) predicate phrase [x(9yMan)(x = y)]. In particular, whereas the
latter are understood to denote an intensional object, the nominalized use of a
name i.e., the occurrence of its nominalization as an argument of a predicate
is understood to denote the extension of the name, where, by the extension of a
name, we mean a group or class as many. In other words, whereas a nominalzed
occurrence of the predicate phrase is human results in an abstract singular
term that denotes the intension of the concept this predicate phrase stands for,
a nominalized occurrence of the name man(or humanwhen used as a name
rather than an adjective) denotes the extension of the nominal concept the name
stands for when used in a referential act; and such an extension is what we mean
by a group or class as many. A class as many is the more general notion and a
group is a class as many of two or more objects. Thus, by nominalizing a name,
proper or common, we transform the name into a term, by which we mean an
expression that can occur as an argument of predicates and that can be properly
substituted for object (or so-called individual) variables, and in particular a
term that denotes, if it denotes at all, a class as many.26
6 Classes as Many, Groups and Atoms
There are three main features of classes as many as the denotata of nominalized
occurrences of names. These are rst that there is no empty class as many,
i.e., that a name that names nothing has nothing as its extension. Secondly,
the extension of a name that names just one thing is just that one thing. In
other words, unlike a set, a class as many with just one member is identical
with that one member. This feature shows that the extension of a proper name
is just the object, if any, that the name denotes when it is nominalized and
occurs as a logical subject, i.e., as an argument of a predicate. Third, classes
as many, unlike sets, are pluralities, i.e., plural objects that are literally made
up of their members so that a class as many of more than one member, i.e., a
group, cannot itself be a member of a class as many.27 Membership in a class
26We do not take object variables to be individual variables if the latter are understood to
have only (single) individuals in the ontological sense as values. Plural objects, or pluralities,
which are not (single) individuals in the ontological sense, will also be values of object variables
in the ontology we are now introducing.
27See [PoM], chapter VI, for Russells discussion and adoption of this notion of a class.
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as many is dened as follows:
x 2 y =df (9A)[y = A ^ (9zA)(x = z)]:
That is, an object x is a member of (a class as many) y if, and only if, y is the
extension of a nominal concept A and x is an A.28 From this it follows that
where A is name variable or constant,
x 2 A$ (9zA)(x = z):
In other words, to be one among the A is to be (identical with) an A, where the
rst occurrence of Ais a nominalized occurrence and the second is as part of
a quantier phrase.
In order to deal with the nominalization of a complex name, such as per-
son who is civilized, we use a cap-abstract, namely, [x^Person=Ci vilized(x)], for
both the common name and its nominalization.29 Thus, [x^Person=Ci vilized(x)],
when nominalized, i.e., when it occurs as an argument of a predicate (such as the
two-place membership predicate 2) is understood to denote the class as many
of persons who are civilized. If there is only one person who is civilized, then
the class as many is just that one person; but if there are two or more persons
who are civilized, then the class as many is taken to be that group of persons
as a plurality, or what we also call a plural object. In this way the notion of a
class as many as the extension of a name, proper or common, covers both the
case when there is just one thing in that extension as well as when there are
two or more things in the extension. The notion of a group is dened in this
logic as follows:
Grp =df [x^=(9y)(y  x)];
where  stands for proper inclusion, i.e., inclusion but with one or more things
in the containing class not in the included class.30 That is, by denition, it is a
theorem of the logic that every group has at least two members:
(8xGrp)(9y=y 2 x)(9z=z 2 x)(y 6= z):
28The value of y is a class as many because every value of the object variables is a class as
many, whether it be a single object (individual) or a plural object, i.e., a plurality.
29See Cocchiarella [LCM] for a detailed description of the notation and development of the
logic of classes as many. It should be noted that this logic is similar to, but not the same as,
mereology. In particular, whereas
(8x)(8y)[xOy ! (9z)(8u)(uOz $ uOx _ uOy)]
is a theorem of mereology, it is not a theorem of the logic of classes as many if the overlap
relation, xOy, is taken to be the intersection of x and y.
30Given the denition of inclusion simpliciter,
y  x =df (8z)(z 2 y ! z 2 x);
proper inclusion is dened as follows:
y  x =df y  x ^ x 6 y:
Again, as we note beloe, the object variables here are not individual variables in the sense
of having only single individuals as values. The values are classes as many, which include
single objects (individuals in the ontological sense) and plural objects, i.e., pluralities.
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Note that because a class as many with just one member is identical with
that one member, then everything, i.e., every object as a value of the bound
object variables, is a class as many though of course not every object is a plural
object, i.e., a group, which, ontologically, is not the same as an individual. For
convenience, following Nelson Goodman, we call things that are ontologically
individual, i.e., things that are not groups, atoms, meaning by this only that
they are the urelements of classes as many. That is,
Atom =df [x^=:(9y)(y  x)];
where the for necessity indicates that not having a proper subclass is nec-
essary to being an atom, i.e., it is a feature that atoms always have in every
possible world.31 It follows, of course, that it is impossible for an atom to be a
group, i.e.,
Atom = [x^=:(9yGrp)(x = y)]:
This is a modal version of the notion of an atom as used by Nelson Goodman
in his characterization of how nominalism understands individuals as opposed
to pluralities or classes as many with more than one member. That is, an
atom according to Goodman, is simply an element of the system that contains
no other element of the system as a member.32 This does not mean that an
atom is ontologically simple, or that we think of conceptual realism as a form
of nominalism. In fact, we count all concreta among the atoms of conceptual
realism, including all physical objects and events of whatever complexity, as
well as all abstracta of the intensional order represented in the logic through the
process of nominalization, i.e., all of the properties and relations(-in-intension)
that are the "object-ied" intensional contents of our predicable and referential
concepts, as well as all of the propositions that are the "object-ied" intensional
contents of our speech and mental acts. All that the notion of atomicity does in
this framework is distinguish those objects, or classes as many, that can be said
to have an individuality, from those classes as many that are genuine pluralities,
namely the classes as many that are groups as dened above. In this framework,
the notion of an object is the same as that of a class as many, and includes both
plural and individual objects, whereas the ontological notion of an individual is
the same as that of an atom.
The notion of atom that is at issue here is not what is represented by the
syntactic category of so-called terms, i.e., expressions that can be properly sub-
stituted for object variables and occur in formulas as arguments of predicates.
It is not the case, in other words, that all of the entities that are represented
by bound object variables and terms are individuals in the ontological sense,
i.e., they are not all atoms. Rather, some of them are pluralities, or what we
are calling groups. Ontologically, what the category of terms and object (or
31The interpretation of  may be no more than the necessity of tense logic namely, always
being the case if there are no modal operators other than the tense operators. If there are
no modal or tense operators at all, then  can be deleted or read as it is the case that.
32See Goodman [WoI], p. 18. If we restrict ourselves to extensional languages, then the
modal notion of an atom is understood to be just the extensional notion intended by Goodman.
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so-called individual) variables represents are classes as many, some of which
are atoms, and hence individuals in the ontological sense, and the remaining of
which are groups or pluralities.
It is noteworthy in this regard that although the proper inclusion relation is
dened in terms of membership, it is in terms of the relation of proper inclusion
(as a relation between classes as many), and not of membership, that the notions
of being an atom and of being a group are dened. In other words, it is proper
inclusion that is generating pluralities; and proper inclusion fullls Goodmans
ontological criterion for what is nominalistically acceptable as a generating re-
lation, namely, that a class as many is not an atom if, and only if, some class
as many is properly included in it.33 The "nominalistic dictum", according to
Goodman, is that "no two distinct things can have the same atoms" (op. cit.,
p. 21); that is,
(8x)(8y)[(8zAtom)(z 2 x$ z 2 y)! x = y]:
This dictum is validated in our logic of classes as many, and in fact it is a
consequence of the so-called axiom of extensionality34 ,
(8x)(8y)[(8z)(z 2 x$ z 2 y)! x = y];
and the fact that only atoms can belong to a class as many, i.e.,
(8x)(8y)[x 2 y ! (9zAtom)(x = z)]:
Having an axiom of extensionality does not mean that nominal concepts that
have the same extension at one time in one possible world necessarily have the
same extension at all times in every possible world. This is because we restrict
the unqualied form of Leibnizs law to atoms; i.e., instead of
x = y ! ('$  );
where  is obtained from ' by replacing one or more free occurrences of x by
free occurrences of y, we take
(9zAtom)(x = z) ^ (9zAtom)(y = z)! [x = y ! ('$  )]
33See Goodman, op. cit., p. 21, where what it means for a relation R to be a generating
relation is that for all x, x is not an atom with respect to R if, and only if, there is a y such
that yRx.
34For reasons having to do with possible conicts with Leibnizs law in tense and modal
contexts, we did not take extensionality as an axiom of the system described in [LCM]. Instead,
we assumed the somewhat weaker rule:
If ` (8z)(z 2 x$ z 2 y), then ` x = y:
We did note there, however, the possibility of assuming the axiom of extensionality and
modifying Leibnizs law so as to restrict its application when applied to groups, which is the
position we now adopt and think is preferable. Groups, it should be emphasized, do not have
di¤erent members at di¤erent times. Rather it is nominal concepts that might have di¤erent
groups as their extensions at di¤erent times.
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as an axiom schema of our framework. The unrestricted form is then assumed to
hold only for extensional contexts. This is an important feature of our logic that
distinguishes the individuality of atoms from the plurality of groups. Indeed,
unlike atoms, or individuals in the ontological sense, the identity of groups, or
pluralities essentially means only that they have the same members, which does
justify the full, unrestricted form of Leibnizs law.
One important theorem schema of the logic of classes as many is the follow-
ing:
(9y)(y = [x^='x])$ (9x)'x ^ (8x='x)(9zAtom)(x = z);
which says that the class as many of things that satisfy ' "exists" (in the sense
of being a value of the bound object variables) if, and only, something satises
' and whatever satises ' is an atom. Accordingly, where 'x is the impossible
condition of not being self-identical, (x 6= x), it follows from this theorem schema
that there can be no empty class as many, which is the rst fundamental feature
of classes as many indicated by Russell. That is, where the empty class as many,
, is dened as follows,
 =df [x^=(x 6= x)];
then a theorem of the logic is:
:(9x)(x = );
as well as
:(9x)(x 2 ):
Another theorem of the logic is the thesis that every atom is identical with its
singleton, which is the second fundamental feature of classes as many indicated
by Russell:
(8x)((9zAtom)(x = z)! x = [y^=(y = x)]):
This means, of course, that every atom is both a class as many and a member
of itself:
(8xAtom)(x 2 x);
and, moreover, that whatever is a member of an atom as a class as many is
identical with that atom:
(8xAtom)(8y)(y 2 x! y = x):
In regard to the third fundamental feature of classes as many, we note that
because only atoms are members of classes as many, then groups, or plural
objects, are not members of anything:
(8x)[(9yGrp)(x = y)! :(9z)(x 2 z)]
Finally, it noteworthy that because names, proper or common, can be nom-
inalized and occur as terms, i.e., as arguments of predicates, another theo-
rem of the logic is that if A is a proper (or unshared) name of an atom,
then (9xAtom)[(x = A) ^ (8yA)(y = x)] is true, and therefore so is F (A) $
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(9xA)F (x), for any predicable concept F , and hence so is F (A) $ (9x)[x =
A ^ F (x)], which is the way this situation is represented in standard free logic.
In other words, proper names of atoms, when occurring as arguments of pred-
icates, function in the logic of classes as many exactly as they do in so-called
standard free logic, and this is true even of proper names that only purport to
name an atom, i.e., an individual, but are really vacuous. Instead of being basic
or primitive, the free logic treatment of proper names of individuals (atoms)
is derived and grounded in our wider conceptualist framework of nominalized
names, proper or common.
7 Groups and the Truth Conditions of Plural
Reference
One way in which the notion of a group is important is its use in determining
the truth conditions of sentences that are irreducibly plural, i.e., sentences not
logically equivalent to sentences that can be expressed without a plural reference
to a group or plural predication about a group. An example of such a sentence
is the so-called Geach-Kaplan sentence, Some critics admire only each other.
Let us note that the plural reference in this sentence is really plural, and
in particular that reference is being made to a group and not just to a class as
many, which might consist of just one member. A single critic who admires no
one would in e¤ect be a class as many of critics having exactly one member,
and every member of this class would vacuously satises the condition that he
admires only other members the class. But it is counter-intuitive to claim that
the sentence Some critics admire only each othercould be true only because
there is a critic who admires no one. Rather, the sentence is true if, and only if,
there is a group of critics every member of which admires only other members
of the group. This can be formulated in our conceptualist logic as follows:
(9xGrp=x  [y^Critic])(8y=y 2 x)(8z)[Admire(y; z)! z 2 x ^ z 6= y]:
Another example of an irreducibly plural reference is Some people are playing
cards, where by some peoplewe do not mean that at least one person is playing
cards, but that a group of people are playing cards, and that they are doing
it together and not separately. The truth conditions of this sentence can be
represented accordingly as follows:
(9xGrp=x  [y^P erson])Playing-Cards(x);
where the argument of the predicate is irreducibly plural.35 Of course, in saying
that a group of people are playing cards we mean that the members of the
35Note that although the verb phrase is playing cards is singular when applied to an
individual (atom), it is plural when applied to a group; i.e., we can say that the group is
playing cards as well as that the members of the group are playing cards, where it is the same
event or situation that is being described. This is similar to the grammatical di¢ cultynoted
by Russell that "[a] collection, grammatically, is singular, whereas A and B, A and B and C,
etc. are essentially plural" ([PoM], p. 69].
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group are playing cards (together), and hence that the members of the group
are playing cards with every other member of the group. That is,
(8xGrp=x  [y^P erson])[Playing-Cards(x)! (8y=y 2 x)Playing-Cards(y)]
and
(8xGrp=x  [y^P erson])[Playing-Cards(x)!
! (8y=y 2 x)(8z=z 2 x=z 6= y)Playing-Cards-with(y; z)]
are understood as consequences of what is meant by saying that a group is
playing cards.36 The converse, however, does not follow in either case. That is,
we could have every member of a group playing cards without the group playing
cards together, and we could even have every member playing cards with every
other member in separate games without all of them playing cards together in
a single game.
A similar analysis applies to John and Mary are playing cards, where the
plural subject John and Mary is taken as referring to the group consisting
of John and Mary just as Russell maintained in [PoM] regarding andas a
combination of terms.37 That is, the truth conditions of this sentence can be
represented as:
(91xGrp=x = [y^=(y = John _ y =Mary)])Playing-Cards(x):
To be sure, given the symmetry of playing-cards-with, it might be argued
that this sentence has the same truth conditions as John is playing cards with
Mary, and Mary is playing cards with John, which is not plural at all, no less
irreducibly so. But then we need only consider a sentence like John, Mary,
and Joan are playing cardsto have a sentence that is irreducibly plural. This
sentence does imply the separate sentences John is playing cards with Mary,
John is playing cards with Joan, Mary is playing cards with John, Mary is
playing cards with Joan, etc., which are not plural, but the converse implication
does not hold in this case. That is, John may be playing two games of cards
simultaneously, one with Mary and the other with Joan, so that John is playing
cards with Mary and John is playing cards with Joan is true without it also
being true that John, Mary and Joan are playing cards together. There are
some kinds of activities between individuals, in other words, that are irreducibly
plural.
Another type of example is plural identity, as in:
Russell and Whitehead are the coauthors of PM.
Here, reference is to the group consisting of Russell and Whitehead, and what is
predicated of this group is that it is identical with the group consisting of those
36 In this example, we understand the preposition withto be a predicate modier that adds
one new argument position to the predicate being modied. Thus, applying this modier to
x is playing cardswe get x is playing cards with y.
37We assume here and throughout that John and Mary and later Joan as well are not
identical and that their names are being used with existential presupposition.
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who coauthored PM. Rephrasing the complex common name co-author of PM
as (thing) who coauthored PM, let us use ~= for the relation between an
English expression and its logical analysis or symbolization. Then, the analysis
of the plural denite description can be given as follows38 :
the coauthors of PM ~= (91yGrp=y = [z^=Coauthored(z; PM)]):
Then, using A and B for Russell and Whitehead, the plural identity
sentence can now be symbolized as39
(91xGrp=x = [z^=(z = A_z = B)(91yGrp=y = [z^=Coauthored(z; PM)])(x = y):
A similar analysis applies to the sentence
The triangles that have equal sides are the triangles that have equal angles.
That is, where Ais a name constant for triangleand Fand Gare one-place
predicates for has equal sidesand has equal angles, respectively, then the two
plural denite descriptions can be represented as:
The triangles that have equal sides ~= (91xGrp=x = [z^A=F (z)]);
The triangles that have equal angles ~= (91yGrp=y = [z^A=G(x)]);
and the plural identity sentence can be symbolized as:
(91xGrp=x = [z^A=F (z)])(91yGrp=y = [z^A=G(x)])(x = y):
We should note, however, that given the axiom of extensionality, this sentence
is provably equivalent to
A triangle has equal sides if, and only if, it has equal angles.
which can be symbolized as:
(8xA)[F (x)$ G(x)]:
38The very tentative approach we adopt here to common names based on a relation, such
as x is a coauthor of y is to treat it as thing x who coauthored y, or perhaps, using the
closest superordinate the context allows, as person x who coauthored y.
An alternative is take x is a coauthor of yas x a coauthor who coauthored y, and similarly
x is a parent of yas x is a parent who is a parent of y, etc. Admittedly, neither approach
for common names based on a relation is as satisfactory as one would like .
39As an assertion, reference is made in this case only to Russell and Whitehead, and the
denite description the authors of PMis deactivated, so that the cognitive structure of the
assertion is represented as
(91xGrp=x = [z^=(z = A _ z = B)[xIS(x; [91yGrp=y = [z^Author=Wrote(z; PM)]])](x):
But because the copula Is in this formula is extensional in it second-argument position, this
formula is equivalent to what we display above. For convenience, we ignore representing
deactivations in this paper when they occur in an extensional context.
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That is, strictly speaking, the truth conditions of this sentence does not irre-
ducibly involve plural reference to a group (or groups).
Another type of example is the predication of cardinal numbers, as in Rus-
sells example, Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smiths suitors. In this
example, as Russell emphasizes, "it is Brown and Jones who are two, and this
is not true of each separately". What the sentence describes, according to Rus-
sell, is a situation that is "characteristic of classes [as many]", which in this
case is of Brown and Jones taken collectively, and not "of Brown and Jones
severally", i.e., distributively ([PoM], p. 57). Indeed, it is in the predication of
cardinal numbers that we nd Russell proclaiming "the fundamental doctrine
upon which all rests," i.e., "the doctrine that the subject of a proposition may
be plural, and that such plural subjects are what is meant by classes [as many]
which have more than one term" (ibid., p. 517), which is what we mean here
by a group. It is this doctrine that is fundamental to our understanding of the
natural numbers, as when we say that the Apostles are twelve, meaning that
as a plurality the group of Apostles has twelve members, not that each Apostle
is twelve. Here, the plural denite description, the Apostles is understood
to refer to the Apostles as a group, which means that we can symbolize the
description as follows:
The Apostles ~= (91xGrp=x = [x^Apostle]):
Of course, the verb phrase x has twelve members can be symbolized as a
complex predicate as follows,
x has twelve members ~= [x(912y)(y 2 x)](x);
where, as is well-known, the numerical quantier 912 is denable in rst-order
logic with identity.40 Note that this is really a plural predicate, i.e., it can be
truthfully applied only to a plurality, namely a class as many, or group, with
twelve members. The whole sentence can then be symbolized as follows:
(91xGrp=x = [x^Apostle])[x(912y)(y 2 x)](x);
or, by -conversion, more simply as
(91xGrp=x = [x^Apostle])(912y)(y 2 x)
Here, again, we have a clear example of Russells doctrine of how the subject of
a sentence can be plural, and that the plurality, or plural object, referred to by
such a subject is a class as many with more than one member.
One might object, perhaps, to the use of paraphrase in replacing The Apos-
tles are twelveby The group of Apostles has twelve members. The objection
40Strictly speaking, the quantier 912is deactivated when it occurs in the predicate of an
assertion. That is, the predicate is then represented by [x([912y] 2 x)]. Note, however, given
the extensionality of 2,
[x(912y)(y 2 x)] = [x([912y] 2 x)]
is provable.
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is not that the noun phrase The Apostles does not purport to refer to the
group of Apostles; rather, the objection is that we need to account for the log-
ical connection between The Apostles are twelveand The group of Apostles
has twelve members, and, in particular, we need to explain the source of the
plural arein The Apostles are twelve.
It is clear, as already noted above, that the plural verb phrase are twelve
is not the plural form of the singular verb phrase is twelve, the way the phrase
are Apostlesis the plural of is an Apostle, and hence that its source cannot
be explained as a simple pluralization of the verb. The explanation that we
will propose in the next section depends on the claim that the most basic way
in which we speak and think about di¤erent numbers of things is in our use
of numerical quantier phrases, as when we say that there are twelve Apostles.
The point we want to note here is that this statement can be grammatically
analyzed as
[twelve Apostles]NP [there are]V P ;
where the noun phrase twelve Apostlesis taken as the subject of the sentence,
and there are, which is the plural of there is, is taken as the verb phrase. It
is our contention that the source of the plural arein The Apostles are twelve
is the arein There are twelve Apostles, which we paraphrased as The group
of Apostles has twelve members. The question that we will return to later is
how do we logically analyze the plural predicate there are and connect the
three di¤erent sentences, There are twelve Apostles, The group of Apostles
has twelve members, and The Apostles are twelve.
8 The Cognitive Structure of Plural Reference
Russell, we have noted, explained the di¤erence between All men are mortal
and Every man is mortalin terms of the denoting concepts expressed by their
respective quantier phrases; that is, he assumed that the denoting concept
expressed by All menis di¤erent form the denoting concept expressed by Every
man. This is plausible because All menis the logical dual of Some men, which
we use when we want to refer to a group of men and not just to one man as in
Some men carried the piano downstairs, which is irreducibly plural. Indeed,
reading the some menin this sentence as at least one man and, as a result,
leaving it open whether more than one man was involved is not correct when
in fact we mean to refer to a group of men. The quantier phrase every man
is the logical dual of some man, when the latter is understood as meaning at
least one man. It is not the logical dual of some menwhen we intend to refer
to a group of men.
This distinction between reference to a group of men as opposed to reference
to some man, meaning at least one, as in Some man broke the bank at Monte
Carlo, is essential in a framework based on the pragmatics of speech and mental
acts, and it should not be eliminated for the sake of logical convenience. The
question is how can we develop this di¤erence in a logically coherent way, and in
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particular in a way that is based on the logical forms that represent the cognitive
structure of our speech and mental acts.
What we propose is to represent plural common names and plural monadic
predicates by an operator that when applied to a name results in the plural
form of the name, and similarly when applied to a monadic predicate results
in the plural form of that predicate. We will use the letter Pas the symbol
for this plural operator and we will represent its application to a name A or
predicate F by placing the letter Pas a superscript of the name or predicate,
as in AP and FP . Thus, we extend the simultaneous inductive denition of the
meaningful (well-formed) expressions of our conceptualist framework to include
the following clauses:
1. if A is a name variable or constant, then AP is a plural name variable or
constant; respectively;
2. if A is a name, x is an object variable, and 'x is a formula, then [x^A='x]P
and [x^='x]P are plural names;
3. if A='(x) is a (complex) name, then (A='(x))P = AP =[x'(x)]P (x) and
[x^A='(x)]P = [x^AP =[x'(x)]P (x)];
4. if F is a one-place predicate variable or constant, or of the form [x'(x)],
then FP is a one-place plural predicate;
5. if AP is a plural name, x is an object variable, and ' is a formula, then
(8xAP )' and (9xAP )' are formulas.
In regard to clause (5), we read, e.g., (8xManP )as the plural phrase all
menand (9xManP )as the plural phrase some men, and similarly (8xDogP )
as all dogsand (9xDogP )as some dogs, etc. We note that a plural name
is not a name simpliciter and that unlike the latter there is no rule for the
nominalization of plural names. This is because a nominalized name (occurring
as an argument of a predicate) can already be read as plural if its extension is
plural, and we do not want to confuse and identify a name simpliciter with its
plural form.
Also, only monadic predicates are pluralized. A two-place relation R can be
pluralized in either its rst- or second-argument position, or even both, by us-
ing a -abstract, as with [xR(x; y)]P , [yR(x; y)]P , [x[y[R(x; y)]P (y)](x)]P ,
respectively; and a similar observation applies to n-place predicates for n > 2.
Thus, for example, we can represent an assertion of Some people are playing
cards with John by pluralizing the rst-argument position of the two-place
predicate x is playing cards with yas follows:
(9xPersonP )[xP laying-Cards-with(x; John)]P (x):
Semantically, of course, we understand the plural reference in this assertion to
be to a group of people, a fact that is made explicit by assuming the following
as a meaning postulate for all (nonplural) names A whether simple or complex:
(9xAP )'(x)$ (9xGrp=x  [y^A])'(x): (MP1)
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Of course, if a group of people are playing cards with John, then it follows that
each person is playing cards with John, though, as already noted, the converse
does not also hold. The one-direction implication from the plural to the singular
can be described by assuming the following as part of the way that the predicate
modier withoperates41 :
(8x)([xP laying-Cards-with(x; John)]P (x)!
! (8y=y 2 x)[xP laying-Cards-with(x; John)](y)):
Similarly, where F is one-place predicate constant for x carries the piano
downstairs, then Some men carry the piano downstairscan be symbolized as
(9xManP )FP (x);
which, by (MP1), means that some group of men carry the piano downstairs,
and hence that some group of men is such that every man in the group carries
the piano downstairs with the other men in the group. Given that the plural
denite description, the men in x other than z, can be symbolized as follows,
the men in x other than z ~= (91y(Man=(y 2 x ^ y 6= z))P );
then that there is a group of men such every man in the group carries the piano
downstairs with the other men in the group can be represented as follows:
(9xGrp=x  [y^Man])(8z=z 2 x)(91y(Man=(y 2 x^y 6= z))P )[yF -with(z; y)]P (y);
which, by (MP1), reduces to
(9xGrp=x  [y^Man])(8z=z 2 x)(91yGrp=y = [y^Man=y 2 x^y 6= z])[yF -with(z; y)]P (y);
where the relation z carries the piano downstairs with yis taken as plural in
its second-argument position.
Now given the logical duality of (8xAP ) with (9xAP ), the way (8x) is dual
to (9x), the postulate for universal plural reference is then as follows:
(8xAP )'(x)$ (8xGrp=x  [y^A])'(x): (MP2)
Thus, because we can represent the cognitive structure of an assertion of All
men are mortalas,
(8xManP )MortalP (x):
then, semantically, by (MP2), that assertion amounts to predicating mortality
to every group of men,
(8xGrp=x  [y^Man])MortalP (x);
41Note that because everything is a class as many, this condition applies even when x is an
atom. In that case, of course, the condition is redundant.
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which is equivalent to saying without existential presupposition that the mem-
bers of the entire group of men taken collectively are mortal:
(8xGrp=x = [y^Man])MortalP (x):
This last, given that the class as many of men is in fact a group i.e., has more
than one member is in conceptualist terms essentially what Russell claims in
[PoM], namely, that the denoting phrase All menin the sentence All men are
mortaldenotes the class as many of men.
Let us note also that the plural verb phrase are mortal is semantically
reducible; that is, mortality can be predicated of a group if, and only if, every
member of the group is mortal. In other words, as part of the meaning of the
predicate mortalwe have the following as a meaning postulate:
MortalP (x)$ (8y=y 2 x)Mortal(y):
We can now see why it is that Every man is mortal implies All men are
mortal, whereas the converse does not also hold; for whereas All men are
mortal is vacuously true when there is just one man, and hence no group of
men, Every man is mortalis not in that case also vacuously true and would in
fact be false if that one man were not mortal.42
In general, in other words, the logical equivalence between Every A is Fand
All AP are FP, where A is a nonplural common name and F is a nonplural
monadic predicate is provable on condition that the class as many of A is a
group, i.e., that there are at least two As:
` (9yGrp)([x^A] = y)! [(8xA)F (x)$ (8xAP )FP (x)]:
Now it would be convenient if every plural predicate were reducible to its
singular form the way that MortalP is, but that is not the case, as we noted
above in regard to the predicate [xP laying-Cards-with(x; John)]P , which is
taken as plural with respect to its rst-argument position, and also the complex
predicate for carrying the piano downstairs with the other members of a group.
Another example of this sort is the sentence Some politicians campaign against
each other. Here, by to campaign against each otherwe understand a verb
phrase that applies to a group only if every member of that group campaigns
against every other member of the group.43 We can symbolize the sentence
accordingly as follows:
(9xPoliticianP )[x(8y=y 2 x)(8z=z 2 x=z 6= y)Campaign-against(y; z)](x)
which, by (MP1), reduces to
(9xGrp=x  [y^Politician])(8y=y 2 x)(8z=z 2 x=z 6= y)Campaign-against(y; z):
42A more perspicuous example is the falsity of Every moon of the Earth is made of green
cheeseas compared with the vacuous truth, on our analysis, of All moons of the Earth are
made of green cheese.
43We also have the somewhat di¤erent irreducibly plural sentence, Some politicians cam-
paign only against each other, which is similar to our earlier example of Some critics admire
only each other.
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It is clear of course that we can go on with many other examples of sentences that
are irreducibly plural, such as Some students met at a restaurant and shared a
pizzaand Some lawyers who are partners are suing the tobacco industry, etc.
There are other kinds of plural assertions whose cognitive structure we need
to formally represent as well. In particular, there are assertions expressed by sen-
tences such as Rogers and Hammerstein wrote musicalsand Mary and Joan
are playing cards with John, etc. These involve the kinds of plural subjects
that Russell had in mind when he introduced his and-operator, which was to
be applied to terms and result in a complex term and which, semantically, de-
noted a group, i.e., a class as many of more than one member.44 The question
is how are we to represent these kinds of plural references, especially in con-
ceptualism where referential concepts are represented by determiner-quantier
phrases? Our proposal is that we add conjunctive quantier phrases to our
logical grammar.
Now if we add conjunctive quantier phrases to our logic, we can represent
the cognitive structure of an assertion of Rogers and Hammerstein wrote mu-
sicalsand Mary and Joan are playing cards with Johnas follows, where, for
convenience, we use A and B for Rogersand Hammerstein, respectively,:
(9xA & 9yB)Wrote-Musicals([z^=(z = x _ z = y)]);
and
(9xMary & 9yJoan)[zP laying-Cards-with(z; John)]P ([z^=(z = x _ z = y)]):
Here, the general proposal is that where A and B are proper names of di¤erent
atoms as we assume Mary, Joan, Rogers, and Hammersteinare and F
is a non-plural one-place predicate, then a sentence of the form A and B are
FPcan be symbolized as (9xA & 9yB)FP ([z^=(z = x _ z = y)]). That is
A and B and are FP ~= (9xA & 9yB)FP ([z^=(z = x _ z = y)]):
In this way, by iterating the conjunctive quantiers, we can represent Russells
so-called "combination of objects", as when we say that A1 and A2 ... and An
are FP .45
As part of this proposal, because, following Russell, we understand the plural
conjunctive reference to A and B to be to the group consisting of A and B, we
assume the following as a meaning postulate as well:
(9xA & 9yB)'([z^=(z = x_ z = y)])$ (91uGrp=u = [z^=(z = A_ z = B)]'(u):
(MP3)
44See [PoM], p. 55.
45This proposal can be generalized and applied to common names A and B as well by
replacing =by 2and noting that in the case of proper names of atoms (z 2 x _ z 2 y)
is provably equivalent with (z = x _ z = y). An example with common names is Dogs and
sailors keep o¤ the grass. We can also allow for generalization to other quantiers as well,
but we will ignore those generalizations here.
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The above two formulas then reduce out accordingly to
(91xGrp=x = [z^=(z =Mary_z = Joan)][xP laying-Cards-with(x; John)]P (x)
and
(91xGrp=x = [z^=(z = A _ z = B)]Wrote-Musicals(x):
9 Where Cardinal Numbers Come From
Finally let us return to the question left unanswered at the end of the previous
section, namely, how we are to analyze the quantier phrase there arewhen it
functions as a plural predicate. Consider, as an example, the sentence, There
are liberal republican senators, which, as noted in section one, we take to be
synonymous with There are senators who are republican and liberal. This
sentence, let us note, is the plural form of There is a senator who is republican
and liberal, which can be grammatically structured as,
[a senator who is republican and liberal]NP [there is]V P ;
and the plural form of the sentence can be similarly grammatically structured
as,
[senators who are republican and liberal]NP [there are]V P :
Now the logical analysis of the above singular noun phrase is,
a senator who is republican and liberal ~= (9xSenator=Re publican(x)^Liberal(x));
and the logical analysis of the singular verb phrase as a predicate is,
there is ~= [x(9y)(x = y)];
the innitive of which can be read as to be an x such that there is something
x is.The singular form of the sentence can accordingly be formalized as:
(9xSenator=Re publican(x) ^ Liberal(x))[x(9y)(x = y)](x):
Now what we propose is that the logical form assigned to the plural form of the
sentence should be derived from the singular form by having both the referential
and the predicate expressions pluralized:
(9x(Senator=Re publican(x) ^ Liberal(x)))P [x(9y)(x = y)]P (x);
which, by (MP1), gives us
(9xGrp=x  [y^Senator=Re publican(y) ^ Liberal(y)])[x(9y)(x = y)]P (x)
as its semantic representation for the plural reference. In regard to the semantics
of the plural predicate, we assume that a group has plural being in the sense of
there areif, and only if, each of its members has being in the sense of there
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is. That is, the being of a plurality reduces to i.e., is equivalent to the being
of each of the members of that plurality:
(8xGrp)([x(9y)(x = y)]P (x)$ (8z=z 2 x)[x(9y)(x = y)](z)):
The right-hand side of this biconditional is logically true (and is a consequence
of the free-logic axiom (8z)(9y)(z = y)), which means that the left-hand side of
the biconditional is equivalent to x = x. This means that the above formula
is equivalent to
(9xGrp=x  [y^Senator=Re publican(y) ^ Liberal(y)])(x = x);
and hence, by the exportation thesis for complex quantier phrases and deletion
of the redundant identity conjunct, x = x, equivalent to
(9xGrp)(x  [y^Senator=Re publican(y) ^ Liberal(y)]):
In other words, the plural form of the sentence semantically amounts to saying
that there is a group of senators who are republican and liberal, which, intu-
itively, is exactly what we understand the initial statement to say. Our general
proposal is that other sentences with a plural there areshould be analyzed in a
similar way, i.e., as being represented by the plural predicate [x(9y)(x = y)]P .
In particular, to return to the question raised in the previous section, the
sentence There are twelve Apostles, which we grammatically structured as
[twelve Apostles]NP [there are]V P ;
can now be logically analyzed as
(912xApostles)[x(9y)(x = y)]P (x);
which, as noted above about the plural predicate, reduces to
(912xApostle)(x = x);
as well as
(912x)(9yApostle)(x = y);
which says that twelve things are Apostles, which is another way of saying that
there are twelve Apostles.46
Now as we suggested earlier the most basic way in which we speak and
think about di¤erent numbers of things is in our use of numerical quantier
phrases, as when we say that there are two authors of PM, three people playing
cards, twelve Apostles, etc. These quantier phrases can be nominalized in
conceptual realism the way that we earlier nominalized the phrase, a unicorn,
46The application of 912 to the singular Apostle is appropriate here because it says in
e¤ect that there are twelve individual Apostles, i.e., twelve individuals named by Apostle.
If we used the plural, ApostlesP , the result would amount to saying that there are twelve
groups of Apostles, which is not what is intended.
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which means that they are rst transformed into a (complex) predicate, which
in turn is then nominalized and transformed into an abstract singular term, the
denotatum of which is an intensional object. This kind of double transformation
is what we described elsewhere as Freges double-correlation thesis except that
Frege attached only the common name objectto his quantiers and took other
common names to be predicates.47 Frege, moreover, being an extensionalist, did
not identify the objects correlated with his quantiers as intensional objects, but
as value-ranges (Wertverläufe). The general idea in any case is that where 9k
is a numerical quantier, which when applied to a name A is read as there are
k many A, the double-correlation thesis can be formulated as follows,
(9F )(8A)(8G)[(9kxA)G(x)$ F ([x^A=G(x)])];
where instead of a value-range as the argument of the concept F corresponding
to the numerical quantier 9k as Frege would have it, we have a class as many.
In particular, taking the numerical quantier 912 for 9k, we have
(9F )(8A)(8G)[(912xA)G(x)$ F ([x^A=G(x)])]:
Now, clearly the concept F that is posited here as provably such that
for all name concepts A and all predicable concepts G, there are
twelve A that are G if, and only if, the group of A that are G falls
under F
is none other than the predicable concept of having twelve members, which we
symbolized earlier as [x(912y)(y 2 x)]. In other words, by the above double-
correlation thesis we have
(8A)(8G)[(912xA)G(x)$ [x(912y)(y 2 x)]([x^A=G(x)])];
from which, by substituting Apostlefor Aand x = xfor G(x), and applying
-conversion, we have
(912xApostle)(x = x)$ (912y)(y 2 [x^Apostle=(x = x)]);
and therefore by canceling the redundant identity in [x^Apostle=(x = x)],
(912xApostle)(x = x)$ (912y)(y 2 [x^Apostle]):
But, as noted above, the left-hand side of this biconditional is equivalent to our
formulation of There are twelve Apostles, namely, (912xApostle)[x(9y)(x =
y)]P (x), which means that the biconditional is equivalent to
(912xApostle)[x(9y)(x = y)]P (x)$ (912y)(y 2 [x^Apostle]):
47See Frege [GdA], vol. 1, section 25, and chapters two and four of Cocchiarella, [LSAP]
for a discussion of this thesis
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But if there are twelve Apostles, then the denite description the group of
Apostles, as symbolized by (91yGrp=y = [x^Apostle]), denotes the same group
as is denoted by the abstract [x^Apostle], i.e.,
(91zGrp=z = [x^Apostle])(z = [x^Apostle])
is true. From this identity and the last biconditional above it follows that the
statement that there are twelve Apostles is logically equivalent to the statement
that the group of Apostles has twelve members, i.e.,
(912xApostle)[x(9y)(x = y)]P (x)$ (91zGrp=z = [x^Apostle])(912y)(y 2 z)
is provable, which is one of the logical connections we wanted to establish.
Finally, let us note that the predicable concept that we predicate in The
Apostles are twelvecan be identied with the concept of having twelve mem-
bers, a concept that every group with twelve members falls under. That is, as a
predicable concept, we can dene each cardinal number K to be the predicable
concept that those groups that have k many members fall under, and then the
cardinal number k itself can be identied with the "object-ied" correlate of
the concept K. In other words, starting with the quantier notion expressed
by There are k many A, we obtain the predicable concept K under which a
group falls if, and only if, it has k many members, and then, by "object-ifying",
or "nominalizing", the predicable concept K, we obtain the number k as the
abstract object correlated with the concept. It is in this way, by going through
referential and predicable concepts and the process of nominalization, that we
are able to grasp and understand the role of numbers as abstract objects.
In particular, the predicable concept 12 can now be dened as the concept
under which an object falls if, and only if, that object is a group having twelve
members:
12 = [y(9A)(y = A ^ (912xA)(x 2 y))]:
The number 12 is then the object correlated with this predicable concept. Thus,
we are able, in this way, to we give a logical ground for paraphrasing The
Apostles are twelveas The group of Apostles has twelve members. That is,
we can now be symbolize The Apostles are twelveas
(91xApostlesP )12(x);
which, by (MP1) reduces to
(91xGrp=x = [y^Apostle])12(x);
which, by denition, -conversion and identity logic, reduces to
(91xGrp=x = [y^Apostle])[x(912y)(y 2 x)](x):
Thus, the three sentences, The Apostles are twelve, The group of Apostles
has twelve members, and There are twelve Apostlesare each seen to be logi-
cally equivalent to one another. Each, moreover, is provably equivalent to the
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following simplest version of all:
12([x^Apostle]):
10 Concluding Remarks
Russells early theory of denoting concepts and classes as many can be recon-
structed and developed in a framework of conceptual realism, which is an al-
ternative to Russells own early framework of logical realism. Just as denoting
concepts are what quantier phrases express in Russells early theory, referen-
tial concepts are what quantier phrases stand for in conceptualism, where by a
referential concept we mean a type of cognitive capacity that informs our speech
and mental acts with a referential nature and accounts for the intentionality,
or directedness, of those acts. A logic of classes as many as the extensions of
both proper and common names can be developed in this framework and used
to account for the truth conditions of plural reference and predication. Among
classes as many we distinguish those that are atoms, i.e., those that have one
member and are identical with that one member, from groups, i.e., those that
have more than one member, which are only pluralities of objects. The atoms,
which can be abstract as well as concrete objects, are the only true ontological
individuals of the framework, whereas groups are simply pluralities of atoms sat-
isfying Nelson Goodmans nominalistic constraints and the being, or existence,
of which is reducible to that of their members. Groups, more importantly, are
the basis of a semantics for plural reference and predication.
The connection between referential concepts and groups, or classes as many,
is a theory of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and
among the latter complex as well as simple common names. Names, proper or
common, and simple or complex, occur as parts of the quantier phrases that
stand for referential concepts. But, like predicates, names can also be nomi-
nalized and occur as terms, i.e., as arguments of predicates and substituends of
object variables; and when they occur as terms they denote classes as many, if
they denote at all, where a class as many of one object is identical with that one
object, and where there is no empty class as many. In this way, proper names of
individuals can function as logical subjects just the way they do in so-called free
logic, i.e., in a logic free of existential presuppositions regarding singular terms.
Le´sniewskis ontology, which is also called a logic of names can be completely
interpreted within this conceptualist framework, and the well-known oddities of
Le´sniewskis system are shown not to be odd at all when his logic is interpreted
in this way.
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